Here’s a bold statement: Vietnam’s political landscape is on the brink of a pivotal moment, and the world is watching to see if its top leadership will undergo a seismic shift. With the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) just around the corner, the question on everyone’s mind is whether the roles of CPV General Secretary and State President will merge into one. But here’s where it gets controversial: while General Secretary To Lam has been consolidating power and positioning allies in key roles, recent political signals suggest this power grab might not happen—and this is the part most people miss. Let’s dive into why.
Since taking office in August 2024, To Lam has swiftly asserted his authority across domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, he’s pushed through sweeping political and administrative reforms with minimal resistance, even placing loyalists like Tran Luu Quang and Nguyen Duy Ngoc in charge of Vietnam’s economic powerhouses, Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Internationally, he’s become Vietnam’s de facto global ambassador, leading high-profile visits that blend economic diplomacy with strategic leadership. Yet, despite his efforts to be treated as a head of state abroad, foreign partners often hesitate—a subtle hint at the limits of his influence. For instance, during his 2025 UK visit, he was welcomed merely as a ‘Guest of Government,’ not a state leader.
And this is where it gets intriguing: Will To Lam push to hold both the CPV General Secretary and State President roles at the upcoming Congress? While his actions suggest ambition, three key factors make this consolidation highly unlikely.
First, the CPV Politburo recently updated its leadership structure, elevating the standing member of the Secretariat to the ‘key leadership group.’ This shift from a ‘four pillars’ to a ‘five pillars’ system—comprising the General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, National Assembly Chair, and Secretariat Standing Member—strongly indicates that the current structure will remain intact. A bold interpretation here: This move could be a strategic check on To Lam’s growing power, ensuring no single leader dominates.
Second, the presidency is currently held by General Luong Cuong, a military heavyweight. His appointment in 2024 reflects a delicate power-sharing agreement between To Lam’s public security faction and Cuong’s military camp. Any attempt by To Lam to seize the presidency would disrupt this balance, likely sparking military backlash. It would also alienate civilian politicians, who’d see fewer opportunities for advancement.
Third, merging the two roles would overburden the leader, risking governance inefficiencies and health concerns. For example, while To Lam was touring Europe last month, President Cuong represented Vietnam at the APEC Summit in South Korea. This parallel leadership ensures continuity—something a consolidated role would jeopardize.
Here’s the thought-provoking question: Is Vietnam’s unique ‘five pillars’ system a strength or a weakness? Unlike China, North Korea, or Laos, where the General Secretary also serves as President, Vietnam’s structure avoids power concentration but can complicate diplomacy and political consensus. On the flip side, it maintains a balance of power and collective leadership, reducing the risk of instability or policy blunders.
For the upcoming Congress, this means the leadership race will likely be less cutthroat. If To Lam secures another term as General Secretary, the presidency will probably stay with the military, possibly with Luong Cuong or Defense Minister Phan Van Giang. But what do you think? Is Vietnam’s leadership structure a model of stability, or does it hinder its global standing? Share your thoughts in the comments—let’s spark a debate!
